References

The Gulf Crisis and New World Order

David Omissi - A uthor of Book "Air power and Colonial Control" U.K. writes:

Other Air Force officers were unhappy that their bombers were being used to prop up an unpopular puppet king. 'Nobody really enjoyed bombing the Kurds,' one pilot later recalled, 'for their crime was merely to be rebels against the Iraqi government. Yet there were some who relished the thought of bringing Kurdish rebels to heel... ' (David Omissi is a research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. His book 'Air power and colonial comrol' was recemly published by Manchester University Press.)

Links Canada February 1991 (Winnipeg Coordinating Committee for Disarmament) states: "Most of the Persian Gulf region was under the domination of the Turkish Ottoman Empire until the arrival of British naval power in the early part of the 19th century. The British conquered and took control over the coastal areas around the Gulf and some of the interior. When oil was discovered in Iran, the British took control over that valuable resource, too. During the First World War, the British promised the Arabs independence (Hussein-McMahon treaty) in return for their support against the Ottoman Turks. But the British also signed the Sykes Picot Treaty with the French, which divided up the region among the two empires based on where each had built railway lines. As a token, the British gave Jordan and Iraq to two branches of the Hashemite family which had ruled Mecca, the holy city of Islam on the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia During this period, Sheikh Ibo Saud, the leader of Saudi family, conquered most of Arabian Peninsula with brutal military force (1902- 1935), killing many men and confiscating flocks of sheep and goats which were the livelihood of the people of the region; the Saudis took no male prisoners. Ibn Saud married hundreds of women as a way of cementing his diverse kingdom. Today, Saudi Arabia is ruled by a royal family made up of a few thousand of Ibn Saud's descendants and relatives. Toe Saudi conquest, which is still fresh in the memories of those who were conquered, engendered hatred for the Saudi family. The people also feel religious dissatisfaction with their rulers, since the

Saudis are not the traditional rulers of Mecca; the Saudis drove out the Hashemites. The Saudi family is further disliked because it has not used the country's oil wealth to benefit the people, who have no say in how the country is ruled. Dissent is ruthlessly and brutally suppressed. In 1953, lbn Saud died. His son and heir, Saud, tried to break the agreement with Aramco in favour of Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis. Under strong American pressure, Saud was prevented from kicking out Aramco. In 1964 he was deposed in favour of his brother Faisal. After the Second World War, Iran had a democratic government led by Mohammed Mossadegh, who nationalii.ed Iranian oil production. A CIA organii.ed coup in 1953 overthrew Mossadegh and installed the Shah in power.

U.S Pledges to Fight for Oil U.S President Jimmy Carter's doctrine (1980) was the pledge to use U.S troops to keep the Saudi royal family in power and to intervene in the Gulf to protect what it considered "our" oil. There was no threat to Saudi Arabia from either Iraq or Iran at the time, so it was clear that the U.S government was pledged to protect the Saudi royal family from overthrow by its own citirens. Carter also pledged to intervene if U.S. oil companies were threatened with loss of control over oil production in the Gulf.

Sampling of public opinio11 on the Gulf War

The Washington Post, June 23, 1991 "Meanwhile Bandar, a nephew of Saudi King Fahd and perhaps the most powerful Arab representative in Washington was also seeking support for the war from Jewish organiz.ations and intellectuals. From August to the war's end, Bandar held meetings with representatives from the Simon Wiesenthal Centre in Los Angeles, the American Jewish congress and AlPAC. He consulted regularly with Jewish Democrats on Capitol Hill, including Solarz and Levine. In January, he invited three well-known Jewish policy experts­ Martin Indyk from the AlPAC-linked Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Michael Mandelbanm from the council on Foreign Relations, and Eliot Cohen from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies- to inspect the Saudi military. "It was a remarkable departure" Cohen said. "The Saudis bad never looked favourably on Jewish intellectuals". The Saudis were immediately interested in Jewish backing for war against Iraq, but they also wanted to neutralize opposition to future arms sales from the United States." "What we are told by Prince Bandar was that as long as Saddam H�ein effected hegemony over the Mideast, no movement on the Palestinian issue was possible" said American Jewish Congress Director Henry Siegman. Siegman said Bandar implied that if Saddam H�ein is no longer, most countries would then approach the issue on pragmatic terms." (Washington correspondent John Judis)

The Record: Sunday Feb 3, 1991 "ILLUSION OF DIPLOMACY MARCHED U.S. TO WAR. BUSH NEVER WANTED REAL NEGOTIATION." By John E. Mack and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Mack is professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and Director of the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age. Rubin is professor of psychology at Tufts University and executive director at Harvard Law School. They wrote this article for the Los Angeles Times:

"The actions and decisions taken by the United States after aug 2, while having the appearance of diplomacy for peace, were in fact the result of deliberate choices toward a very different end. It was three choices - the president's assertions notwithstanding- that moved us inexorably along the path of war.

We demonized and dehumanized our adversary. We indulged in personal name calling, false analogies in past wars and demonic leaders of earlier times, then deliberately provoked Hussein through threats and insults, while lessening his incentive to respond to the pleas that were directed lo him by so many individuals and nations.

We denied our own contribution to the problem. By placing the blame entirely on the shoulders of our adversary, failing to acknowledge our own contribution - bolstering Iraq's war machine and giving permissive signals before the conflict began, for example - we put him on the defensive and further limited his ability to respond constructively.

Sampling of public opinion on the Gu{f War

We paid lip service to efforts at diplomatic solutions . We indulged in a hypocritical pretence by announcing our "willingness to go the extra mile for peace" then refusing Hussein's demand that a meeting take place closer to Jan 15 than we liked. We were willing to talk only on our tenns, which we knew Hussein would have to reject.

In conclusion, the Bush administration's approach to dealing with unjustifiable Iraqi invasion of Kuwait violated the principles of negotiating theory, political psychology, and the appropriate conduct of international relationships. If our purpose was to destroy Iraq as a military and political power in the Middle East, which now seem apparent, the American people were never informed of such an intention."

10 of 10 left today