Chapter 7: Punishment For Apostasy

Murder in the Name of Allah, Part 8

Abdullah b. Al-Harith quotes a very interesting incident which he witnessed himself when he visited Ali b. Abdullah b. Abbas. He was deeply shocked and dismayed to find Ikramah bound to a post outside the door of Ali b. Abdullah b. Abbas. He expresseed his shock at this cruelty by asking Ali b. Abdullah b. Abbas if he t ad no fear of God in him. What he obviously meant was that Ikramah, with all his renown of piety and so on; did not deserve such a base and cruel treatment at the hands of his late master’s own son. In response to this, Ali b. Abdullah b. Abbas justified his act by pointing out that Ikramah had the audacity to attribute false things to his late father, Ibn Abbas.”! What better judge of the character of Ikramah could there be than Alib. Abdullah b. Abbas? No wonder, therefore, that Imam Malik b. Anas (95-179 AH), the pioneer compiler of hadith and an Imam of jurisprudence held in the highest repute throughout the Muslim world, held that the traditions narrated by Ikramah were unreliable.”

The following scholars of great repute have declared that Ikramah had a strong disposition towards exaggeration: Imam Yayha b. Saeed Al- Ansari, Ali b. Abdullah b. Abbas and Ata b. Abi Rabae.”?

This, then, is the man who we are dealing with and on whose sole authority the matter of the lives of all those people who change their faith is left hanging till the end of time.

Ibn Abbas

Whenever the name of Ibn Abbas”* appears at the head of a chain of narrators, the vast majority of Muslim scholars is overawed. They forget the fact that because of his name and reputation concocters of false traditions tended to trace their fabricated chain of narrators back to him. Therefore, all traditions beginning with the name of Ibn Abbas must be properly judged and examined.

Moreover, even if Ibn Abbas is honestly reported by a narrator, the possiblity of human error on Ikramah’s part regarding what Ibn Abbas might have said cannot be ruled out. The following would be a good illustration of the case in point:

Tbn Abbas says that Umar used to say that the Holy Prophet said that

crying over the dead brought chastisement to the dead. Ibn Abbas further

said that after Umar died, he related this tradition to Ayesha who said,

‘God forgive Umar!’ By God, the Holy Prophet* said nothing of the

kind. He only said that if the descendants of a disbeliever cried over

his dead body, their action tended to augment his punishment, and by

way of argument, Ayesha also said, ‘Sufficient for us is the saying of

the Holy Qur’an: “Verily no soul can bear the burden of another.”*>

If a man of Hazrat Umar’s stature and integrity can misunderstand the Holy Prophet*, however rarely it might have happened, how much more is there danger of ordinary narrators misunderstanding the reports of Ibn Abbas?

With such wide possibilities for the miscarriage of the message of the Holy Prophet of Islam*, how can a sane person rely entirely on the evidence of this hadith and draw conclusions of far-reaching import regarding matters of life and death and fundamental human rights?

It is likely that Ikramah concocted this tradition, attributing it to Ibn Abbas, as it was his wont to do, according to Ali b. Ibn Abbas.

Other internal criteria

When we examine the subject matter of the tradition under consideration, we find the contents to be erroneous in several ways.

a) A person of Hazrat Ali’s stature is presumed to be unaware of the fact that Islam categorically prohibits a person to be punished by fire.

b) The words ‘slay whosoever changes his faith’ are so general that they can be interpreted in many ways. They can apply to men, women and children, whereas according to Imam Abu Hanifa and some other schools of jurisprudence, an apostate woman can never be slain.

c) The Arabic word deen (religion) used in this tradition is a general word meaning any religion, not Islam specifically. Even the faith of idolaters is referred to as deen. (Sura Al-Kafiroon)

In the light of the general nature of the language used, how can one restrict the application of this tradition to a Muslim who renounces his faith? In strict legal terms, according to this tradition anyone who changes his religion, whatever that religion is, would have to be put to death. It would mean slaying the Jew who became a Christian, slaying the Christian who became a Muslim, and slaying the pagan who adopted any new faith. ‘Whosoever’ also transcends the geographical boundaries of Muslim states, implying that anywhere in the world, anyone who changes his faith - be he an aborigine of Australia, a pygmy of Africa or an indian of South America - must be slain forthwith the moment he renounces his previous faith and accepts another one.

Islam lays a great deal of emphasis on proselytizing, so that it is binding upon every Muslim to become a preacher in the path of Allah. How ironical it is therefore that many renowned Muslim scholars today negate the very spirit of Islamic jihad by audaciously sticking to the narrow-minded view that Islam dictates that whosoever changes his faith, meaning in this context Islam, must be put to death forthwith. What about those of other faiths? Islam declares it to be an obligation upon Muslims to stand committed to the noble goal of constantly endeavour- ing to change the faith of all non-Muslims around them by peaceful means. This task is so important and demanding that every Muslim is instructed to stick to the endeavour till his last breath.

The Holy Qur’an states:

Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and

reason with them on the basis of that which is best. Thy Lord knows best

those who have strayed away from His way; and He knows best those

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