Preface to the Third Edition
Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam, Part 26
The other incident is more recent. During the last decade, plague, which had ravaged the country in accordance with the prophecy, and as a proof of the truth of the Promised Messiah (as) , began to subside and the number of seizures during the last two or three years was so small that the Government was able to express the hope that it would be entirely stamped out within a year or two. Early last winter however, I saw in a dream a plague-stricken man and some buffaloes which ran about in the streets. Buffaloes in the language of dreams indicate pestilence. I had the dream published in the Alfadl, warning the people that a severe outbreak of plague was impending. Within a month cases of plague began to occur and in February 1924, it assumed the form of an epidemic. During March, April and May the epidemic assumed very serious proportions and the weekly mortality list swelled to between eight and thirteen thousand. The total mortality has so far exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand which is more than the total mortality of the last five years from plague.
I have cited these two incidents merely as instances. God has, on numerous occasions, revealed to me the knowledge of things hidden and thousands of Ahmadis have had similar experiences with reference to the different attributes of God. It must, however, be remembered that such experiences are vouchsafed to man not at his will and pleasure but out of the pure grace of God in the manner that He pleases, and at the time that He wills. Man cannot at his will obtain access to the different attributes of God but God constantly grants such access to His servants to increase their knowledge and strengthen their faith and to bestow upon them a distinctive mark of honour. We believe that even now if a people sincerely and earnestly turn towards truth, God will, out of His perfect grace and wisdom, manifest His attributes to them, for He likes His servants to be rightly guided and not to fall into error and drift away from Him.
Islam, therefore, presents a perfect conception of God and opens the gates of certainty and faith, so that men may be saved from the darkness of doubt and error. It leads men to the presence of God in this very life, so that death loses all its terrors for them, and they await its coming with all pleasurable anticipations, realizing that they have found the truth and have experienced the manifestation of God’s attributes, and that death hides nothing but opportunities of limitless progress.
The Second Object of Religion
Morals
The second object of religion set out above is in fact a corollary of the first. A man who attains to a complete realization of God would naturally eschew immoralities and evils of all kinds and, conversely, the more a man is involved in vice the farther away from God he drifts. The Holy Qur’an says, 'Those who sin in ignorance,' meaning that the real cause of sin is lack of true knowledge and realization of God, which is a self-evident truth. A sensible man will not knowingly thrust his hand into fire; he will not eat food which to his knowledge contains poison; he will not enter a house which he is certain is about to fall; he will not thrust his hand into the hole of a serpent; nor will he enter the den of a lion unarmed. Men being so much afraid of fire, poison, serpents, and lions, how can it be supposed that they would rush into and revel in vices and immoralities if they had a perfect realization of God and knew that these things were more deadly than poisons and more dangerous than serpents and lions? It is, therefore, clear that sin is the result of ignorance and lack of true realization of God, and that a religion which leads to certainty of faith and true realization of God will necessarily perfect the morals of its followers. But as the subject is in itself a vital and interesting one, and most people cannot derive any great benefit from mere inferences but stand in need of detailed exposition, I shall briefly set out the teachings of Islam concerning this object of religion.
In dealing with the first object of religion I had pointed out that the fact that all religions agreed in giving some name or other to the attributes of God had no significance at all, and that our attention should rather be directed to the details and explanations furnished by each religion concerning such attributes; for it could never be that a religion should openly ascribe some defect or shortcoming to God. Therefore a comparison between different religions was possible only if we tried to discover the details of their teachings concerning the attributes of God. If these details did not correspond with the true attributes of God, a religion could not claim that it acknowledged these attributes, nor could we conclude that that religion shared with other religions a common conception of God. If a man calls water milk, that will not make water milk; nor will any sensible person be deceived by the mere name in the absence of the qualities of milk in water. The same is the case with the moral teachings of different religions. In instituting a comparison between these teachings we can pay but little regard to general moral injunctions, for no religion is likely to teach its followers to try to win the pleasure of God by, for instance, a course of lies, thefts, robberies, oppression, breaches of trust, abuse, vituperation, quarrels, strife, disorder, etc. Nor can we imagine that a religion would exhort its followers not to speak the truth, or not to act with kindness or affection, or to commit breaches of trust, or to dislike progress and reform, or to discard nobility, dignity, self-respect and meekness, or to suppress all feelings of beneficence and gratitude. A religion which aspires after universal acceptance and respect, is bound to provide a code of moral teachings, that code being common to all religions. If it fails in this respect human nature is sure to revolt against it, and thus it would be doomed to swift disappearance.
Such general moral injunctions, therefore, do not help us much. They are common to all religions, and no religion can pride itself on its exclusive proprietorship of them, nor can we derive any intellectual benefit from this sameness of moral teachings, for it is the result of compulsion and not of any deep insight or research into the sources and working of human nature and conduct. I am often amused by the attempts of people who seek to establish the superiority of their respective religions and to propagate their faiths by first putting together all the general moral injunctions and then representing them as their own exclusive teachings. Whereas the fact is that these injunctions are not peculiar to any religion; they are common to the most ancient, the most primitive as well as the latest and, if I may say so, the most advanced religions. Even the peoples or tribes that are reckoned among savages and have very crude ideas about religion would, if we disregard their actions, and question them calmly and kindly about morals, tell us something very closely resembling that which is taught by more advanced religions. It is, therefore, absurd to base the truth of one’s religion on factors which are the property even of savages. In comparing the moral teachings of different religions, therefore, we must have regard to the details and explanations of moral qualities, their sources and the means of acquiring them, and the sources of evil conduct and the means of avoiding it, etc.
I desire at the outset to point out that there is a great deal of misapprehension and misunderstanding concerning the true conception of morals and moral qualities. This too operates as an obstacle in the way of instituting an accurate comparison between the teachings of different religions. There is a general notion that love, forgiveness, courage, etc., are good moral qualities, and that anger, hate, severity, fear, etc., are undesirable qualities. This is an entirely erroneous conception, for all these are natural instincts and are neither good nor bad in themselves. Neither are love, forgiveness and courage; nor anger, hate, severity and fear, moral qualities. They are merely the natural instincts of man—nay, even of animals. We find them among animals also, for they too love and forgive, exhibit courage, anger, fear and hate. But has any one ever said that a sheep or a cow or a horse possesses high morals? What we call high moral qualities in man are called instincts in animals. Why should this be so? Why is it that those things which are described as high morals in man are not given that name when found in the lower animals? The reason is obvious. We know that these natural instincts or tendencies are not in themselves good or bad morals, and that it is something else in man the operation of which turns them into moral qualities.
We must, therefore, search for that something else in man, which converts natural tendencies into moral qualities. That something else is supplied by the operation of reason and good sense. Natural tendencies when governed and regulated by reason and good sense become moral qualities, and as every man is presumed to regulate his conduct by reason and good sense, these being the qualities which distinguish man from other animals, man’s conduct is termed moral, although, as a matter of fact, in many instances it may only be the result of a natural instinct or tendency. Some people, for instance, are so forbearing by nature that they never object to anything, and some are so determined that they never relinquish a project which they have once taken in hand. Neither of these classes of persons can be described as possessing high moral qualities, for their acts and omissions are not governed by reason or intention but are almost involuntary, just as the fact that a dumb person refrains from abusing others or that a maimed person refrains from causing hurt to others, is not a moral quality, but the result of a physical disability. In short, the proper use, and not merely the use, of natural instincts and tendencies is a moral quality.
Having cleared the ground so far, we can easily understand that a religion which teaches us merely to be kind, or forgiving or affectionate or brave, does not teach us good morals, but merely enumerates our natural tendencies. Are not all these qualities to be found in animals? Are not animals kind and brave? Do they not love and forgive and show sympathy? We very often see that an animal approaches another animal which happens to have been injured, stays near it, and looks at it affectionately so as clearly to convey the impression that it is expressing its sympathy with the other. Again; we sometimes see animals licking each other in affection. Instances may be multiplied to show that all these instincts are to be found in them. Such teachings, therefore, amount to no more than directions that we should obey our natural instincts, and have no greater moral value than injunctions to the effect that we should eat when we are hungry and should drink when we are thirsty and should sleep when we feel fatigued and worn out. Surely, we do not stand in need of religion to tell us all this. Our nature is a sufficient guide in these matters. A religion which merely repeats these things proves its own futility, for this means that it is not aware of the true conception of morals.
Can any one point out a country where the people do not love, or sympathize with one another in distress, or forgive the faults of others, or are not charitable to the poor? Or, is there a single individual in existence, who does not exhibit most of these qualities? Then, how does a religion improve matters by telling us to do these things?
If, however, by telling us that we should be kind, forgiving, brave, etc., a religion means that we should never exercise severity, or inflict punishment, or exhibit fear, it may have a claim to novelty, but its teachings would be unnatural. We are, by nature, endowed with these qualities, and it is impossible for us to renounce them, nor can a renunciation of them improve our morals, for all that nature has bestowed on us is for our good, and its total suppression or renunciation is more likely to injure our morals than to improve them. For instance, if we are told always to be kind and never to be severe, it would mean that teachers should never admonish their pupils, parents should never rebuke their children, and a Government should never punish those who rebel against it. Again, if we are taught never to be influenced by fear, it would mean that we must always persist in a course of conduct which we have once adopted, even if our error has become manifest to us, and should pay no heed to consequences and should not be afraid of incurring any loss or damage, whether relating to our temporal affairs or to our faith or belief. Can any reasonable person describe these as instances of good moral qualities? Morals mean the use of natural instincts and tendencies befitting the occasion, and not their use on all occasions regardless of their propriety or impropriety. On the other hand, the total suppression of these tendencies is both unnatural and harmful. Only that religion, therefore, can be said to have realized the philosophy of human conduct and morals, and to have given correct directions with regard to them, which clearly grasps the distinction pointed out above and lays down rules of conduct with reference to it and does not merely enumerate our natural instincts.
So far as my knowledge extends, Islam alone, of all religions, has kept this distinction in view and has laid down correct rules of conduct. For instance, the
'The recompense of evil should be in proportion
thereto; but if a man forgives a trespasser, under