Preface to the Third Edition
Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam, Part 29
The second form which revenge might take in a case where the aggressor is a powerful man and the person aggrieved is unable or unwilling to inflict pain on him, is that of abuse and fault-finding. Concerning this the Holy Qur’an says, 'Do not impute faults nor abuse each other.' Fault-finding and abuse are, therefore, prohibited in all cases, and even an aggrieved person should not have recourse to them in revenge. What is the reason underlying this prohibition? Why should not an injured person injure his oppressor by finding fault with him, and why should he not relieve his feeling by heaping abuse on him? The answer is that abuse is prohibited because it is false and immodest, and Islam does not tolerate falsehood or immodesty. Defamation and fault-finding are prohibited because, instead of reforming the conduct of the aggressor, they are likely to injure it, for, when a man’s vices are proclaimed openly he loses all sense of shame and decency and begins to indulge openly in them.
The third form of revenge is that the aggrieved party should cut off all intercourse with the offender. Islam disapproves of this form of revenge also. The Holy Prophet (sa) has said, 'It is not permissible to a Muslim to cease speaking to his brother for longer than three days,' i.e., he must resume speaking to him within three days.
The fourth form of revenge is to entertain spite against the aggressor. This is also condemned by Islam. God says in the Holy Qur’an, 'We have driven out spite from the hearts of the believers,' that is to say, a Muslim should not be spiteful. The Holy Prophet (sa) has said, 'A Muslim is not spiteful, and does not harbour malice.' Islam, therefore, permits only one form of revenge and that is to inflict on a trespasser punishment in proportion to the wrong done by him, and even this is subject to the condition that if there is an established Government in the country, retribution must be exacted through the machinery appointed by the Government and the person aggrieved must not take the law into his own hands. If there is no Government, the punishment may be inflicted by the person aggrieved, but it must be in proportion to the wrong suffered; and if forgiveness is more likely to reform the offender, he must be forgiven. The other forms of revenge, that is to say, abuse, fault-finding, nursing of spite, etc., are all condemned by Islam, for they tend to promote evil and discord, and the real object of vengeance, viz., the reform of the offender, is not achieved.
Another natural instinct of man is love which is again common to man and other animals. The opposite of love is hate. Both these natural instincts are converted into moral qualities by the use which is made of them. We can neither love everything nor hate everything; it is necessary to place restrictions and limitations on the working of these instincts.
We find that we naturally love those objects that are either useful to us or which yield comfort or pleasure to any of our senses. But this is not a moral quality, for such feelings of love are to be found among animals also. Love will be a moral quality, first, if it is exercised in proper proportion, that is to say, those who deserve a greater portion of our love than others should receive more of it, secondly, if it is based more on gratitude for benefits, received in the past; than on the hope of receiving benefits in the future, for the former is an obligation and the latter mere self-interest, and thirdly, if it has regard not merely to immediate benefits and pleasures but also to remote ones. When thus regulated the instinct of love becomes a moral quality, otherwise it is mere natural passion. Islam prescribes these three conditions. The Holy Qur’an says:
'Say if your parents and your children and your
brothers and your sisters and your wives and your
husbands and your kinsfolk and the property which
you have acquired and your business the dullness
of which you fear, and your dwellings and your
homes which you love, are dearer to you than God
and His Apostle and striving in the path of God,
then wait till God issues a decree concerning you,
and God loves not those who forget their responsi-
bilities.'
This verse describes the gradation in which those who deserve our love are to be loved by us if our love is to be a moral quality and not a mere instinct. Each is to be loved in proportion to his or her proper rank in our affections. God is to be loved in proportion to his rank, and the Prophets, in proportion to theirs, and religion and parents and children and wives and husbands, in proportion to theirs. If that were not so, love would not be a moral quality but mere passion. For instance, if a man forsakes his parents for the sake of his wife, or ignores the call of his motherland for the sake of his property, he cannot be called good on account of his love for his wife or his property. He has, no doubt, loved, but his love is not controlled by his reason or his judgment, and is not, therefore, a moral quality.
The second condition is that it should have greater regard for past benefits received than for present enjoyment, or the hope of receiving benefits in the future. Under this condition love for one’s children becomes an instinct and love for one’s parents becomes a moral quality. The love of parents for their children is merely a manifestation of the instinct of preservation of the race, but the love of a child for his parents is a moral quality, for the parents have already done what nature wanted them to do, and now they are almost useless. A son, therefore, who loves his parents exercises a good moral quality, for he does so in remembrance of the benefits received by him from his parents during his childhood and in return for that kind and loving care he considers it a duty to treat them kindly and to provide every comfort for them even at the sacrifice of his own. That is why Islam has said, 'Paradise is under the feet of one’s mother,' and has not said, 'Paradise is under the feet of one’s children,' for every sane person instinctively loves his children, but every person may not instinctively love his parents, and, therefore, does not love them as they deserve. Instances are not wanting of persons who neglect their parents in order to provide for the smallest needs of their children. Nobody would say that this is a good moral quality.
The third condition necessary to convert love from an instinct into a moral quality is that it should have regard not merely to immediate benefits and enjoyments but also to remote ones. For instance, a man loves an object, but that love injures his faith or his morals. In such a case love would be a natural instinct but not a moral quality, for the consequences of such love are bad and not good. If a mother, out of love for her child, does not rebuke him for his faults, her love is merely an instinct and not a moral quality, for if it were the latter, the mother would have censured the child for his faults, and attempted to correct them, for the real good of the child is in being rebuked in such a case and not in being petted. In this connection the Holy Qur’an says:
'O believers, real love is this that you should
save yourselves and your wives and children from
destruction.'
Hate is another natural instinct, as opposed to love. The natural operation of this instinct is to repel or avoid those things that are useless or harmful, or those that are disliked. Some religions condemn the feeling of hate, and pride themselves on teaching high morals. No natural feeling is, however, to be condemned merely as such, as the use and application of such feeling, on the proper occasion, is to be commended and not condemned. What is to be avoided is the excess or diminution of such feeling above or below the proper standard. Excess of hate would be enmity, that is, an inclination born of dislike, which incites a man to acts of transgression towards the object of such dislike. On the other hand, lack of the feeling of hate on a proper occasion argues a lack of self-respect, that is to say, a failure to dislike a thing even when it offends against one’s sense of self-respect, dignity, etc.
Hate, therefore, is not in itself immoral; it is a mere natural instinct. It is only its improper use that is undesirable. For instance, the Holy Qur’an repeatedly condemns spite or enmity, and describes it as the quality of unbelievers and transgressors, and never ascribes it to the believers. At a few places enmity has been ascribed to God and the believers, but there it means the recompense of enmity and not enmity itself. On the other hand, Islam, just as it condemns enmity, disapproves of the feeling of dislike and hate being suppressed altogether, for they are the necessary supports of dignity, self-respect, etc., which are admittedly good moral qualities. How is it possible that we should regard a thing as evil and should feel no repugnance towards it? All evil is spiritual uncleanliness. When we see a man in a filthy condition or in dirty clothes, we feel a repugnance towards him, even if he is nearly related to us, and nobody would condemn this feeling of repugnance. Then, why should we condemn the feeling of spiritual repugnance which arises from our witnessing an evil deed? This feeling is to be commended, and when it is exhibited in its proper place and occasion it is a good moral quality.
In fact all this condemnation of hate and repugnance is due to a confusion between evil and the evildoer. No doubt, we must care for and look after even the evil-doer, but we must also hate and dislike evil. If we do not condemn the evil of the evil-doer, we shall not be prompted to reform him. Islam has pointed out this distinction. The Holy Qur’an says: