Preface to the Third Edition
Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam, Part 28
Similarly, oppressive, disorderly and dishonest designs are immoral according to Islam although the person who entertains them is unable to carry them out owing to lack of courage or lack of means. Such a person does not deserve to be called good, merely on the basis of such of his actions as can be seen.
Conversely, a man who has the good of humanity at heart and is anxious to serve his fellow-beings and to promote their welfare, is according to Islam a good man, although he may be unable to translate his thoughts and wishes into action owing to lack of means or opportunities for such service.
There is, however, an exception to this general rule. A man who is assailed by evil thoughts,—for instance, by pride, jealousy, hate or evil suspicions, but who suppresses them, is not guilty of an immorality, for such a man really combats evil and deserves commendation. Conversely, a man who experiences a sudden rush of good thoughts or a sudden inclination towards doing good, but does not encourage such thoughts or inclination, does not deserve to be called a good man on that account, for, as has already been said, good or bad morals are the result of deliberation and design, and in these two instances good and evil thoughts were not the result of deliberation, but were, as it were, involuntary. The Holy Qur’an illustrates this principle in the verse:
'God will call you to account for those thoughts that are the result of deliberation,” and not for those that are accidental and are driven out as soon as discovered.
The Holy Prophet (sa) explains this by saying:
'If a man is assailed by an evil thought but he suppresses it or drives it out of his mind and does not act in accordance with it, God will bestow upon him a good recompense for having so acted.'
This exception which relates to such morals as concern the individual himself, is also applicable to morals which affect others. As God says:
'God will recompense those people with good who avoid evil of all kinds, whether great or small, and when they are about to commit evil under a sudden urge, check themselves and turn away from it.'
That is to say, if a man, owing to carelessness or under the influence of sudden passion, is about to stumble into evil, but as soon as he perceives what he is about to do, checks himself and pilots himself to safety, he will not be counted a bad or immoral man. On the contrary, his conduct will deserve praise, for he is like a man fighting in the defence of his country though he has not yet attained complete victory.
I shall next illustrate the teachings of Islam concerning morals by reference to specific moral qualities. This subject is so vast that to deal with it in any detail one would require much larger space than I can here afford. I shall, therefore, confine myself to the discussion of only a few moral qualities by way of illustration. In doing so, I shall keep in view the classification which I have indicated above in defining morals, viz., that morals consist in the proper use of natural instincts.
I shall first deal with the natural instincts of pity and revenge. Man, in common with other animals, possesses the natural instinct under which he tries to avoid inflicting pain on others, and the sorrows and misfortunes of others affect his mind in such a manner that he begins to share in their troubles. All persons would feel drawn towards a sick person and would have sympathy for him; except perhaps those who are too busy to pay him any attention or those who may have suffered at his hands. The latter, very likely, instead of feeling any sympathy for the afflicted person, may actually enjoy the sight of his suffering. This last feeling is called Naqam, or vengeance and is a distinct feeling which comes into operation when a man suffers pain or loss at the hands of another and wishes to inflict pain or loss on him in return. In a case like this the feeling of revenge displaces the feeling of pity or compassion; and the person who inflicts pain, instead of pitying the man on whom pain is inflicted, derives a distinct pleasure from his suffering. The feeling of revenge, unless controlled by law, assumes several forms. Some times the person aggrieved is able, or imagines that he is able, to inflict pain on the aggressor, and he proceeds to inflict, or attempts to inflict, on the latter such pain as the latter had caused to him, his object being that the latter should suffer as he had himself suffered. In other cases, the aggressor or his family or tribe may happen to be more powerful than the aggrieved person, or the latter may imagine that a repayment in kind would not be approved by others, or owing to some other reason he may be unable or unwilling to inflict real pain on the aggressor, so he uses the weapon of invective or backbiting against him. It might happen that the aggressor is so powerful that the aggrieved person cannot even use his tongue against him. In such a case, he may discontinue visiting him and put an end to all intercourse with him. In some cases even this may not be possible and then the aggrieved person may merely entertain spite against the aggressor, and take pleasure in the misfortunes and sufferings of the latter and be displeased at his success and good fortune.
The natural instinct of vengeance thus manifests itself in many forms, and incites a person to a variety of acts. To put a restraint upon the working of this instinct and to place it under the control of reason is called moral, and to permit it to work unrestrained and uncontrolled by reason would be immoral.
Islam defines the restraints to be placed upon the working of this instinct, which are necessary to convert it into a moral quality, in the following verse:
'If a man commit a trespass against you, you
may inflict upon him punishment proportionate
thereto.'
This is the general rule and regulates the conduct of those whose reason and judgment are not sufficiently developed to appreciate the niceties of moral rules of conduct. For those whose reason and judgment have been better developed a further restriction is placed in the verse:
'The reward of those who forgive the trespass of
others, intending thereby to effect a reformation, is
with God. God loves not the transgressors.'
A person who forgives, when forgiveness would promote disorder, and one who punishes when punishment would harden the offender, are both transgressors, and God loves not such conduct. In other words, a restriction is placed on the exercise of the feeling of pity, which leads to forgiveness, and of revenge, which leads to punishment. It is laid down that when forgiveness is more likely to produce a good impression on the offender and to save him from further wrong-doing, pity ought to be allowed to have its course and he should be forgiven. But when punishment is expected to have a more deterrent and reformative effect on the offender, then the feeling of retribution ought to be allowed to operate, and punishment should be inflicted, but it should in no case be out of proportion to the wrong done or the offence committed. This is with reference to the first form of revenge, that is to say, where the aggrieved person is able in his turn to inflict pain on the aggressor.