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The Nehru Report and Muslim Rights, Part 35

(b) ·' The Supreme Court shall have no jurisdiction in cases where the Commonwealth Government or Parlia ment has acted in exercise of the po'\ivers under the pre

ceding sub-clause." (Ibid., p. 36).

The first part of this clause is attended with a danger of the gravest nature. That it invests the Central Gov

ernment with the power and the right to suspend, alter or annul in cases of emergency laws, enacted by pro

vincial governments, completely demolishes their inde

pendent position. The rest of the clause, if couched in legal language so as to obviate the possibility of different inte.rpretations can be of substantial use and benefit. But the first part of it, I repeat, is extremely dangerous for the Muslims because the Hindu majority in the Central Government taking advantage of the words '' in cases of emergency '' would be free to interfere with the internal management of the provinces in which Muslims are in a majority and thus will seek to hamper and impede their progress and advancement. I, therefore, strongly object to this clause and suggest that the substance of the clause should be as follows:-

(a) No Provincial Government shall have the power to frame laws calculated directly to affect the administration of any other pro .. vince or the lives of its inhabitants ; and if any Provincial Government frames any such laws, the Central Government shall have full authority to suspend or annul it.

(b) But in all such cases the Provincial Govern

ment thus affected shall have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Central Government, if it finds that the Central Government, while sus pending or annulling the law framed by it has misused or overstepped its lawful authority.''

5. An unwholesome change has also been introduced in clause 29 under the title ·' The Provincial Legisla tures.'' The Nehru Report had reserved the appointments of governors of provinces for the King. But the Supple mentary Report has transferred this royal prerogative to the Governor-General in Council. The modification sug gested by the Supplementary Report is '' there shall be a Governor of every province who shall be appointed by the Governor�General-in-Council." (Ibid., p. 39, Cl. 29). This change is, indeed, fraught with great risks. It has made the Provincial Governments entirely subservient and wholly subject to the control of the Central Govern ment. The appointment of governors should directly be made by the King and the Governor-General should have no voice in the matter as it is at present done in the case of the Presidency governors.

6. Another modification is made in clause 72, part, vi. (Ibid., p. 47). This modification aims at the creation of five new provinces. On principle we have no right to find fault with this recommendation, but it quite clear ly shows that the members of the Nehru Committee are possessed with an irresistible desire to see the Hindu element predo?linates over the Muslim element in respect of provinces as well as individuals.

7. Regarding the amendment of the Constitution it was originally stated in the Nehru Report that the repeal or alteration of any of the provisions of the Constitutiond could be effected by the agreement of .. the 2/3rds of the total number of members of both Houses.'' The modified clause 87 of the Supplementary Report now reads as ·' the bill embodying such repeal or alteration shall be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting to gether and at the third reading shall be agreed to by not less than four-fifths of those present." (Ibid., p. 50).

This alteration is, indeed, an improvement upon the original recommendation, but even this improvement does not adequately safeguard the interests of the minori ties. The repeal or alteration of any of the provisions of the Constitution should be made subject to the agree ment of 4/ Sths of all the elected members, instead of 4 / Sths of the members present at a particular sitting, because it is quite possible that on account of acute poli tical differences or as a protest against a certain measure, or owing to any other reason one section of the elected members of a legislature may be non-co-operating with other members, and the party then in majority in the House, taking advantage of the absence of a part of its members, should have an alteration made in the Consti tution or have a provision thereof repealed. To make amendment of the Constitution subject to the agreement of four-fifths of only the members present at a particular meeting places the foundations of this provision on a very weak basis.

8. Dealing with the question of communal repre sentation the Nehru-Report had recommended, ·' there shall be no reservation of seats for any community in the Punjab and Bengal.'' The Supplementary Report amended this clause as �' there shall be no reservation of seats for any community in the Punjab and Bengal, provided that the question of communal representation will be open for reconsideration, if so desired by any community after working the recommended system for 10 years." ( Ibid. p. 50.) The amendment is quite meaningless. In a representative form of government the decision of the majority is always enforced. This modification gives no guarantee to any minority even if they insist and persist in their demand for reservation of seats that after 10 years reservation of seats will actually be granted to them. What is offered them is that the question of communal representation will only be open for reconsideration. But after the expiration of 10 years the question of communal representation is recon isdered, and the Hindu majority in the Central Govern ment decides rhat no change in the existing law is possible, in what conceivable manner would the Muslims get back their lost rights? In view of the fact, this modification is highly deceptive and is nothing short of jugglery in words.

The last but not the least change to which I object is that which is introduced in Clause 4 under the heading • • Communal representation.'' The original recom mendation of the Nehru-Report was '' Reservation of seats, where allowed, shall be for a fixed period of ten years.'' To this clause have been added the words '' provided that the question shall be open for re consideration after the expiration of that period if so desired by any community." ( Ibid. p. 51.) This addition is clearly superfluous. The words '· the question shall be open for reconsideration '' lay down no fixed policy, no definite course of action. Evident! of all minorities it is very largely for the sake of t{' Muslims that the. provision for the reservation of seat: ha

s been m�de �n the Co�stitution. If the exercise of this concession 1s beneficial to them, it requires no special intelligence to understand that they will never demand its repeal or alteration. Whenever any demand is made to repeal or alter this provision, the Hindus alone will make it. In other words the amended clause means that if after the lapse of ten years the Hindus will demand that the Muslims should enjoy this conces sion no longer, this question will again be considered. The consideration will demonstrably be made by the Central Government in which the Hindus will ever be in a majority and the decision in such a case can easily be imagined.

After this short review of the Supplementary Report of the Nehru Committee, I venture to reiterate my contention that the modifications and alterations �m� bodied in the Supplementary Report ,vill do more harm than good to the Muslims. All I can say in favour of the Nehru Committee is that it has shown great adept ness and dexterity in the choice of words and phrases which are susceptible of interpretations bearing a sense quite opposite to that they apparently intend to convey. But this is not commendable.

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