A Rebuttal to the Reply written by Bawa Narayan Singh Sahib

Early Writings, Part 2

Hence, if souls were infinite, why is it an established creed of the Arya Samaj that they cease to exist when they undergo the two states just mentioned? It is utterly surprising to see Bawa Sahib turning away from his own principle. He does not even realise that such things which cease to exist in one state maintain the same inherent nature in other states as well. Bawa Sahib also fails to understand that the contents of a vessel cannot be larger than the size of the vessel itself. Therefore, when all souls, by entering into the vessel of time and space, clearly demonstrate that they have a specific period of existence after which they will appear in a new world, and when they are always measured against the yardstick of time and space, it is strange that Bawa Sahib still has doubts about the finite nature of souls.

Here, I would also like to ask Bawa Sahib that if, as you have stated, all these souls—which in your view are eternal—naturally move towards the earth for their existence, what rational impossibility hinders their movement towards those who have already obtained salvation? What logical argument proves that they cannot move towards those who have already obtained salvation? Which propter quid or quia argument is there to prove that it is only towards the earth that these souls are permitted to return after each cycle of creation and that their departure towards the abode of those who have already obtained salvation is barred and impossible? I cannot see which well-paved road leads to this temporal world on which all souls, to the exclusion of none, easily come and go from the earth, but what sort of a boulder is blocking their way to the abode of those who have already obtained salvation. If God can cause all the souls to die or be born, why is He unable to grant them salvation? While He can change their condition in one respect, why is He unable to bring about a change in their condition in the other respect? Is it impossible for God to declare all of them to have obtained salvation, just as He has, until now, declared them to be deprived of salvation? For all such entities to which the absence of a certain characteristic can be attributed, may be characterised with an attribute in the affirmative sense as well.

Moreover, it should also be clear that the proposition that all souls which exist at present can obtain salvation is not under discussion here because the predicate of this proposition—salvation for all—is debatable like the particular of a general issue. What is actually being discussed here is a universal concept. In other words, my discussion on the issue at hand is from the aspect of totality; that is, whether or not, in accordance with the belief of the Arya Samaj, all souls that exist at present, which are yet to obtain salvation, are subject to a universal occurrence be it salvation or some other phenomenon. In this respect, I would like to thank the people of the Arya Samaj, for they have on their own acknowledged that in certain circumstances, a universal condition does extend over the souls as a collective whole, just as the state of death or birth can overtake all souls existing at a given time. Bawa Sahib should now give a just verdict and explain that while he acknowledges that a common state in two cases can affect all existing souls in their entirety, why does he deny the possibility of their experiencing a third state—the state of salvation for all?

Bawa Sahib further says that apart from the earth, animal life is found abundantly in the sun and moon, and in all the stars; and this, for him, is sufficient evidence to establish that souls are infinite. It ought to be clear to Bawa Sahib that firstly this theory has only been put forward by some philosophers and has been adopted particularly by European thinkers. Our discussion, however, is in light of the belief held by the Arya Samaj. However, even if I do grant that the Arya Samaj also holds the same belief, this does not benefit them, for this too does not serve their purpose. All this proves is that the creation of God Almighty is abundant. How is the aforementioned argument relevant to the infinite nature of souls? Perhaps under the influence of common perception Bawa Sahib also believes that things found in abundance are the same as being infinite. Bawa Sahib needs to understand that while all earthly and heavenly bodies are limited and finite in their scope, as experts of astronomy and geography have shown, how can things that dwell within their sphere be infinite? While God has numbered all the earthly and heavenly bodies, along with the entities that exist in both, how could such things that reside within them be excluded from His count?

In short, such arguments on your part do not establish the truth of your claim. Your claim will be valid only when you prove that all existing souls are beyond every limit, confine, and every sphere of time and space, and beyond the realm of the heavens. The reason for this is that God is called Infinite on the basis of this very principle. Hence, if the souls are infinite, it should be proven that they too possess the same qualities because you state that the word ‘infinite’ is applicable to both the souls and the being of God Almighty, and that this word has one absolute definition. That is to say, the word does not carry a different meaning when used with reference to God and when used with reference to the souls.

After this, Bawa Sahib says that so far no one has been able to fully count the souls, which means that they are innumerable. To prove this, he also quotes a law of mathematics—which has nothing to do with the point being discussed. Then he concludes from this that an infinite number cannot be decreased. It should be clear to Bawa Sahib that in light of his own belief, I have already given an estimated number of the souls and I have already discussed their being restricted within the bounds of space and time according to Bawa Sahib’s own principles. However, Bawa Sahib puts before us calculations of things which are unknown and incomprehensible. If Bawa Sahib suggests that just as a treasurer knows of every rupee and penny present in his account, only if man is aware of the total number of souls in the same way, can there be a possibility of that number being decreased, then I would say that he is mistaken. This is because any intelligent person knows that when the total number of a thing is estimated by some form of measure, rationality would establish that when we subtract an amount from that estimated total, the number that is taken away from it would decrease that estimate. What logic can be presented in favour of the notion that when a large host of those souls that have been granted salvation will join those who have already obtained salvation, the total number of souls will neither decrease nor increase here or there, despite the fact that both are limited in number and confined within the spheres of space and time?

The statement of Bawa Sahib that we must know the total number of souls and only then will we be able to subject them to the rules of addition or subtraction, also deserves the attention of our worthy readers. It is evidently clear that it is God who adds or subtracts, and He is aware of the total number of existing souls and He possesses knowledge of each and every one of them. So what doubt can there be in the fact that when a soul will leave the first group to join the ranks of those who have obtained salvation, God will surely know about the resulting decrease in the former number and the resulting increase in the number of the latter. How strange is it to suggest that despite the souls leaving one group or another group, their total number will remain the same and that there will neither be any addition to the souls that have obtained salvation nor any decrease in the total number from the others after some will have left their group. Apart from this, there is no logical argument that would prevent me from reaching a conclusion on the clear and established fact that such things about which we know are bound by the limits of time and space are subject to a decrease or increase in number depending upon their entry into or exit from a specified grouping. For example, if there is a large stock of grain piled in a room and people take a portion of the grain, even if we do not know the exact weight of the grain, one can easily say—as the grain is limited—that as people take it away, its amount will obviously decrease.

Then you have written that since God’s knowledge is infinite and souls are also infinite in number, this is why God is unable to determine the total number of the souls. This is an irrelevant statement. My good sir! Who is denying the infinite nature of God’s knowledge? The contention and dispute rather pertains to the information He independently possesses regarding entities which may be specified and exist at any given time—confined within the limits of time and space—and whether or not the specific number of those existing, limited and finite entities is within His knowledge. Your points would be relevant only if you prove that those present and finite entities transcend the realm of existence and are infinite. For it cannot be said that just because God’s knowledge which encompasses both existing and non-existing entities is limitless, therefore, a certain entity which may be specified in number is also limitless.

Alas, how infinite you have shown God’s knowledge to be whereby He can neither encompass the souls, nor count them, and this is despite the fact that all these souls are within the realm of existence, they are not non-existent. How astonishing that while heaven and earth have announced in practical terms the number of souls—by containing them within itself—but God is unaware of this number. Strange indeed is such a God and even stranger His knowledge! My question to you is whether the knowledge of God regarding the existing souls constitutes only a part of His limitless knowledge or the whole of it? If your answer is that it constitutes the whole, then this would necessitate that God possesses no knowledge of anything except for His knowledge of the souls and that no one possesses a greater knowledge than Him in this regard. However, if your answer is that it only constitutes a part of His knowledge, then this would imply a limitation, for a part is always smaller than the whole. Hence, this also leads to the conclusion that the souls are finite, and in reality, this is the truth. He, whom God has enlightened with understanding, knows well that out of His boundless ocean of knowledge, God’s knowledge concerning existing souls does not even make as small a part of

His knowledge as the amount of the water that remains on the tip of a needle after it has been dipped into the ocean.

Then, Bawa Sahib says:

It is unreasonable to raise the objection that being infinite and eternal is a divine attribute, and that if the souls too are

believed to be infinite and eternal, they will become equal to

God, because partial similarity does not constitute equality.

For instance, both man and beast see with their eyes; but the two can never be the same.

This argument put forth by Bawa Sahib is false and misleading. For every sensible person knows that all the attributes found in God’s being are, in fact, unique qualities of His Peerless Being.

There can be no equal or partner with God in respect of His attributes. For if association was deemed possible in one attribute, then there could be partners with God in all His attributes. And, when it is possible to be a partner with God in all His attributes, this would essentially justify the existence of another God. How do you explain that while it is possible for the eternal attributes of God Almighty, namely, His being without beginning and infinite, can exist in beings other than Him, yet His other attributes are exclusive to Him alone? You will have to think about whether you consider all the attributes of God Almighty to be of the same stature or whether some differ from others in respect of their significance. Evidently, if partnership is possible in terms of one specific attribute, then it is possible in any number of other attributes, and if not, then the same principle applies to all of them. You present the example that although animals too see through their eyes like human beings, yet in doing so they cannot be deemed equal to or comparable to human beings. The example you have cited here is not a befitting one. Had you pondered even slightly in this regard, you would not have presented such an example at all.

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