Text
The Nehru Report and Muslim Rights, Part 13
(3) When there is something peculiar in the minority which prevents it from being absorbed in the majority, the latter feels ill at ease over the prospect of the country being always divided into two parties with no hope of the minority merging in the majority, nor even of its being so reconciled to the majority that its distinctive features might disappear and there• might be at least an outward appearance of unity.
( 4) When a minority has such potentialities as to
make the majority apprehensive that, if not curbed the minority will one day become the majority.
(5) When the minority does not consider itself to belong to the country and has its eyes fixed upon its brethren beyond the country, then the majority feels apprehensive lest the minority should some day deal with
it treacherously, and therefore it tries to suppress it.
(6) When the majority is benefitted materially by the
economic backwardness of the minority, it is afraid lest it should lose by an awakening among the minority.
These are the six important causes, the existence of some or all of which makes the majorities resort to a policy of aggression against the minorities, and the minorities distrustful of the majorities. A consideration
of these factors will lead every sensible man to the con
clusion that there is no reason why bigger minorities should be less in danger than smaller ones. On the con trary, it is apparent that whether the minority be big or small, it will be equally in danger whenever there are present the above-mentioned conditions. In fact, a very small minority which forms only one or two per cent. of the entire population, or less, has practically nothing to fear, because the majority is fully confident that its posi tion is in no danger. It is therefore that the Christians, the Buddhists, and the Parsees, who together form only one-tenth of the whole population, are in no danger at all.
If there is any class that is in a real danger, it is the
Mussalmans, regarding whom the Hindus might feel apprehensive that they might one day increase and over whelm them.
In other countries too we find no discriminative pro cedures adopted between big and small minorities. In Europe, for instance, in dealing with the protection of minorities no differentiation was made between big and small minorities. In Poland, for example, where the minorities exceed 28 % of the population, their rights have been protected. ln Czechoslovakia, the Germans alone number about 25 % of the total inhabitants. In theit case too, safeguards have been provided. T d say that only small minorities require to be protected is therefore not only unwise but also contrary to a practice universally observed. I am, therefore, surprised to see the Nehru Committee boldly putting forward a theory. opposed alike to sense and precedent.
In this connection, I cannot help remarking that to the powerful anything might suffice for an argument. For it is strange that here we find in India the major com munity viz., the Hindus, trying in the ehru-Report to persuade us to the doctrine that only small minorities and not large ones stand in need of prot,�ctive laws. The Report says:-'' It ( protection) might have been neces sary for the small communities which together form )0° ' of the total." ( P. 28 ).
On the other hand, we find the Government of Estho nia, a small State formed out of the old Russian Empire, where the minorities form only 10°,� of the population, in reply to the demand of the League of Nations that some legislative measure should be introduced to ensure the protection of minorities' rights, observes that • • the minority in their country is numerically so small that no need is felt for the protection of its rights." ( Vide, The
Protection of Minorities, p. 114). It is paradoxical indeed
that while the Indian majority should be unwilling to
accede to the Muslirn demand for protective laws on the ground that they are not so small in number as to require
any protection, and that such a demand can be entertain-- ed only on behalf of a minority numbering, say lOo/rJ of the total, the majority in Esthunia should plead that the minorities in their country are too few to need any pro tection, being 10% only. One fact, however, is apparent in both cases. The motive is the same. That irrespec tive of the minorities being small or large, the majority is unwilling to concede to them their rights, and is bent upon their destruction on some pretext or others.
Having proved the falsity of the doctrine that the need for protection depends upon the size of the minority, I now turn to the other proposition, namely, that the mere enactment of uniform laws ensures the due administra tion of justice. I have used the word � uniform • to signify both justice and equality. The two possible significances of the proposition are that-
( 1) when the same laws apply to all, justice becomes established, and there is no occasion for anyone to grumble, and
(2) when both parties are treated on a basis of equality, and the laws are such as give due consideration to the need of both parties, then also there is nothing to complain about.
To my mind the doctrine is fallacious in both of its interpretations. For, it is wrong that the formula tion of one and the same law for all communities gives no occasion for grievances because it leads to the establishment of justice. Nor is it right to assert that when laws are framed in fairness with a view to secure the respective rights of different communities according to their needs, their rights are safeguarded, and there remains no further grievance. The first argument, that ,vhen one and the same law applies to a whole country, nobody should have occasion to complain because justi ... e demands that all should be treated equitably, is errone ous, because in the first place men happen to differ from one another in their conditions. As such. the effect of the laws is not the same in all cases. Some they affect more than others. When, therefore. a particular law affects a certain community most, and does not either affect another at all or affects it nominally. such a la\v cannot be said to be equitable. For instance, if a law prohibiting cow-slaughter ·were enacted for the '\.vhole of India as is even now being done by certain municipalities, will it be held equitable merely for its being applicable to the Hindus and the Muslims alike? � 'ot at all. Such a law will be judged not by the fact that it applies equally to all communi6es, but it will have to be seen v.Thich community does it affect adversely. As a people the Hindus are opposed to cow-slaughter. it is evident that even if the law applies equally to both the Hindus and the Muslims, the latter alone stand to suffer. To take another example: if the Government of the Punjab were to pass a law declaring that all lands should be Government pro� perty, or if such a law were passed in Sindh, then the consequent loss to the Hindus will be only slight con1 pared to the loss suffered by the 1\luslim comn1unity. Similarly, if heavy taxes were imposed upon trade with the ultimate intention of destroying it, no one will say that the tax will affect the Muslim community equally with the Hindus. Every intelligent man will understand that the tax is intended to hit the Hindus. It is thus a mistake to think that the enactment of uniform laws will dispose