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The Nehru Report and Muslim Rights, Part 18

Under the first system, the one sponsored by the Muslim League, the Central Government cannot interfere

with the internal affairs of the Provincial Governments,

nor can it deprive them of any privilege, nor is it, in the event of any new work arising, entitled to undertake the same ; the Provincial Governments alone having the right to undertake it, or to transfer it to the Central Govern ment, according to the rules framed for the purpose, by the majority in the Provincial Council. On the other hand, according to the system sponsored by the Nehru

Committee. the Central Government is the supreme authority, with full power to interfere in the internal affairs of provinces, to deprive them of any p1ivileges whenever it chooses to do so, or, to alter the very form of the pro vincial governments. It can, if it likes, curtail the })owers of the Provincial Governments and extend its own. Rights to eve-�y new work will belong to the Central Govern ment, which will be competent to transfer it to the Pro vinces or to retain it by itself.

Let us now examine the effects of these two proposals upon Hindu-Muslim relation. Muslim population in India is about 2S�lo of the whole, and however generously they may be treated, they are sure to remain a very small minority in the Central Government. The Nehru Com mittee proposes to grant them only 25 % of the seats in the Legislature. There will thus be 3 Hindus to 1 Moslem in the Central Parliament. The Muslim League demands a minimum of one-third of the seats for the Muslims. In this case, there will be 2 Hindus to 1 Mu&,lim in the Cen tral Body. In either case it is evident that the Muslim minority can do nothing against the Hindu majority. The Central Government will, therefore, necessarily be dom inated by the Hindus. Under the circumstances, with an omnipotent Central Government and the provinces reduced to mere agencies, the only possible result will be that the Government will be run by the Hindus ; and even if a few provinces are constituted as predominantly Muslim. it will be in the power of the Hindus to regulate thP Government according to their sweet will. The Nehru Committee has thus obviously paralysed the Muslims by rejecting the federal form of Government for India, ac cording to which all provinces stand as equal partners. Even if all the other demands of the Muslims were enter tained, but for this alone they will have no voice in the

.Government of the country. For further elucidation, let us assume that all other Muslim demands have been acceded to. Let us examine how things will stand under the form of Government proposed by the Nehru Committee.

According to the Muslim demands, of the provinces, Bengal, the Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the N. W. F. Provinces shall be predominantly Muslim, while the U. P., Behar, Bombay, Madras, the Central Province and Assam shall be predominantly Hindu. According to the Nehru Committee's recommendation, the provinces in spite of certain powers and privileges, shall be mere agents of the Central Government, where the Hindu element will preponderate. Under such conditions, it may easily be seen that, there will be nothing to prevent the Hindus from having their way in all matters. For example. the Punjab and Bengal Governments might resolve to give to the Muslims their due share in the University or decide to increase their representation in the services in proportion to their population and there upon the Ce�tral Government might step in and say that the measures were communal in their nature and must not be proceeded with. The two Provincial Governments might refuse to be bullied, and then, as a result, the Central Government might move a bill proposing to de prive the two provinces of certain privileges or to alter their constitution ; for, according to it they would have proved themselves unfit to govern. What will then the position of the Muslims be? It is useless to ask why such a contingency should arise. Does not the Govern .. ment even now supersede Municipalities for some alleged mistakes? With the Central Government as the supreme authority, the provinces would be reduced to the position of mere Municipalities. Whatever powers might be dele-- .gated to them, they would be nothing more than agents, and as such liable to be deprived of their powers by the Central Government-their real master. What then will be left to the Muslims?

Further. according to the Nehru Constitution, the Central Government shall have the power to modify the territorial limits of the provinces. The Punjab and Bengal are at present predominantly Muslim provinces. If the Central Government resolves upon a territorial redistribu �ion of the provinces and incorporate Assam to Bengal, or separate the Oriya districts from Bihar and incorporate them to Bengal ( on the plea that Oriyas being a small community cannot have a separate province of their own, and it is� therefore, decided that they should all be brought together under Bengal), the Mussalmans will be left helpless, and by this one single change apparently non�communal, the Muslim majority in Bengal would be reduced to a minority, and all the privileges which the Muslims would have secured. would naturally go over to the Hindus. Similarly changes might be wrought in the Punjab. The U. P. is a very large province with a popu1ation almost double that of the Punjab. The people of the districts of the Mianwali, the Rawalpindi and Allock, are more akin to the Afghans than to the people of the other districts of the Punjab in their social life and customs, and similarly Dera Gazikhan has close affinity with Baluchistan. Now, if the Central Government, at any future time, should decide that those districts of the Punjab, which have affinity with the Afghans, shouid be annexed to the Frontier Provinces, and the district of D·era Gazikhan to Baluchistan, say, what would then be left of the Muslim majority in the province? And further, if the same Government were to direct that the districts of minority] Ancl with tlH: Musfjrn .rnnj,Hity ir th.. .. two

the Mu9Ji,n provinces of the Punj, h and B

provinc will be the rc;a] rnaslcrs r1nd the entr

1 Gov rnm nt will have only dcJegate<l authority with

I rovin · without it con sent. nor lo dt'.priv,.. it of auy of

it pow r on th all ga tion of tnis�govern,,u.. nt.

h ad alik of th 1-Iindu provinces and th Muslirn provinces,

what reason have

I· or, th simple reason is that I linclu-Muslim ·r lations ar

not cordial. nor is there any likelihood of their improv

ment in th n ar future. And even if th mutual relations

should show some im-

'provement. the chang unclc.. r th

existing conditions can

hardly b depended upon, as th history of the last fifteen

years shows that they undergo

changes several times a year. Further. it is a strange

irony of fate that the Muslims are always th losing party,

whether their rela-

tions are cordial or strained. It is therefore, natural, that Muslims should be apprehensive of the Central Govern ment and not the Hindus. The Muslims of the Punjab may well fear that the Hindu Central Government Plight convert the province into a Hindu province, but there is no ground for the Hindus of the· U. P. to be afraid of a Central Government in which Hindu element preponder ates. To argue, therefore, that the system would affect all uniformly is mere deception.

Neither can it be urged that, in the event of such -circums�ances arising, the Governor-General of India or the Government of Great Britain will interfere, for the simple reason that the �en, who are not prepared to meet the reasonable demands of the Muslims to-day, can hardly be expected to do so in future. Besides. can we afford to leave such an important issue for the Governor ·General alone to decide? If we have so much trust in the judgment of a fore1gner, what justification is there for this great indignation against the Simon Commission which consists not of one but of seven persons, whereas -in future, the Governor-General will be single to decide the issue. It should also be borne in mind in this con nection, that under a constitutional Government, the Gov ernor-General will be no more than a mere figure-head.

It may be urged that, in order to dispel the fears of the Mussalmans and to �ake their position secure, pro vision may be made in the constitution, that the Central Government shall have no power to 1nterfere with the provincial Governments, nor shall it undertake any terri torial redistribution without the consent of the provinces concerned. To this our simple answer is that if the Nehru Cominittee recommendations be so amended as to remove their defects, we can have little objection to accept the same. What we contend is that in its present form, the Report is unacceptable to the Muslims. With regard to this particufar issue, however, I do not agree that the rights of the Muslims will be secured even by the introduction of the proposed a�endments. For even if the proposed amendments are incorporated in the constitution, what guarantee is there that the constitution itself will not be changed in future? �'hen the supreme authority will lie with the Central Government with power to alter the constitution, it will certainly be competent to change these laws in future and arrogate to itself the power to interfere in the affairs of the provinces in case of necessity, and also to alter their territorial limits. Thus so long as the Central Government wields the supreme authority, there will be no real safeguards for Muslim rights. The remedy lies only in vesting the pro vinces with supreme power.

I wonder how a section of our politicians has sought to magnify the merits of the Nehru-Report, which as it appears to me, has only served unnecessarily to inflame the Muslim opinion by disregarding their rights in some non--essential matters. If the Nehru Committee had simply recommended a Central Government with supreme powers, and then granted to the provinces complete auto nomy, and yielded to the Muslim demand for separat.! electorates, and majority of representation in the Punjab and Bengal, even th{.n the Hindus would not have suffered in the least. For, after the attainment of Dominion Status, they could have easily withdrawn all the privileges of the Muslims whenever they wished to do so. But it seems that a mean spirit of bargaining had swayed them against their better judgment so much so, that they did not feel disposed even by a word of mouth to make any con cession to the Muslims. !It reminds me of the story of the Baniya who in good humour used to say to the Afgan Grandee,-'· Well Khan Sahib ! your property is PlY pro perty and my property, Ha r Ha ! Ha ! . '' The Baniya could not even in jest bring himself to say that his pro perty was the Afgan' s property. He therefore broke off with a laugh. Similar has been the case with the Nehru Committee. It could not even in jest offer to the Muslims their just rights. Barring the question of the power of the Central Government, had the Committee conceded to the Muslims all their other demands, then in all likelihood the bulk of the Muslims would have been effectively be fooled, and all the efforts of the few intelligent minds among them, who could divine the real purpose, would perhaps have been of no avail to undeceive the Mussal mans.

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