Text
The Nehru Report and Muslim Rights, Part 28
ties as a rule are more zealous than majorities, and further that in the Punjab the Muslims are confronted with two minorities each conscious of its minority posi tion and consequently very active, and still further the dangerous reality that the two minorities being combined together would approach the numerical position of the Muslims, the risk increases and we cannot but admit that if the Muslims would secure a position of supremacy at one time, these rival communities would most certainly hold sway at another. rfhese eventualities preclude the possibility of the Muslims enjoying the same opportunity for progress that the Hindus shall enjoy in other pro vinces. As a result the Muslims would, in a few years, have perforce to submit absolutely to the influence of the
Hindu culture, and lose their own national identity and existence. For the development of culture, a powerful government is not so essential as its continued existence. And this is possible only with a reservation of seats. The Hindu element, under such conditions, would form a part of almost every government, but in my opinion that would help to prevent the development of a communal government, and to bring about inter-communal unity.
Muslim Representation in the Central Government.
The fourth demand of the Muslims is for one-third of the seats in the Central Government ; or at least for a guarantee of their present position. As already stated, this demand also has been rejected by the Nehru Com mittee, which says:-" We have given our best consi deration to the matter but we regret we are unable to recommend reservation of one-third of the total number of seats for Muslims in the central legislature.·' ( Nehru
Report, p. 54.) The committee proposes instead that in
provinces where the Muslims are in a minority, their rights shall be reserved and in the Punjab and Bengal, there shall be an open contest.
I have already explained that according to the ad mission of the Nehru Committee itself, in provinces where the Muslims are in a minority, far from being able to secure more than their proper share, they would hardly be able to win seats even in proportion to their population. It is, therefore, sheer madness to expect that, as a result of the arrangement recommended by the Nehru Committee, the Muslims will be able to win seats in excess of their population ratio. The arrange ment will, in fact, prove a severe blow to the Muslims. It is, therefore, indispensable that at least a third of the seats in the Central Legislature should be reserved for them.
The arguments put forward by the Nehru Committee against such Reservation of Seats are as follows :-
( 1) To grant to any community representation in ex cess of their population ratio is contrary to the principle of Representative Government.
(2) If the Muslims are granted representation in excess of their population ratio, it would be an injustice to the other minority communities.
(3) If a third of the seats in the Central Legislature be reserved for the Muslims, then it would be difficult to allot the seats to the provinces. Under the circum stances, the Muslims shall have to be granted reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal, a suggestion which we have already discarded. Thus apart from such re servation being contrary to principles, it is difficult of practical application.
The first argument that it is contrary to the principle of Representative Government to grant to any com munity representation in excess of their population ratio is altogether wrong. Had it been otherwise, then in all international negotiations the bigger nations ,ivould have had a larger number of represe;ntatives than the smaller nations. But the fact is that, in the matter of votes, we find the small state of Belgium enjoying the same rights as the vast British Empire with its four hundred millions of population. Thus, in the consideration of national questions, it is not numbers alone that count, but there are also other factors to be taken into consideration.
To my mind, in order to understand the principle of proportion in representation, it is necessary to understand the real significance of Representive Government. The basis of Representative Government lies in the principle of individual freedom, subject to the limitations that, ( 1) for the purpose of a successful career, every man is ob liged to associate himself with some form of Government, and (2) exercise of freedom is permissible only so long as it does not interfere with the rights of others. In as much as these two objects cannot be attained without some kind of organisation, the necessity arises for the establishment of organised Governments. And since it has been admitted that every man is free, the best form of Government is one which requires the least sacrifice of individual freedom and gives to every man the maxi mum share in the work of administration. As Govern ments are always formed of large collection of men, and no large number of men can be expected to entertain the same views on all subjects, and further, as it is not possible to consult all men on every matter, it is so arranged that, instead of consulting the individuals on particular issues, the adult and the wise among them are asked to elect the persons, in whose opinion in affairs of the state they have their confidence, so that these persons might be asked to give their opinion on particular issues, as they come up for consideration. Save these, there is no other reason for the establishment of Repre sentative Government. But the whole chain of reasoning points to one basic principle, namely ,-freedom of the individual. Every man is free and has full right to make his own decision in all matters concerning himself. T0 surrender personal rights for the sake of the government is a matter of necessity. Whoever surrenders such rights, makes a sacrifice for the sake of his country and the people. And what persuades him to make such sacrifice is the knowledge that men have different minds, if they differ from him in one thing, they are likely to agree with him in another. If, therefore, on a certain occasion he surrenders his own opinion for the sake of others, they are likely, according to the same principle, to follow his opinion on another occasion.
So far as it concerns the individuals, the above reason ing is quite effective, specially in matters relating to poli tics. But when questions of nationality and religion in tervene, the reasoning fails to hold good, for no body is prepared to sacrifice his nationality, or his religion. He is prepared to surrender his individual opinion for the sake of the majority, because, he hopes, that in some other matters the majority would follow his opinion ; but what consideration would induce him to sacrifice his nationality, or his religion? Can he hope that others would likewise be prepared for his sake to sacrifice their nationality, or their religion? And even supposing that some one be so prepared, can any honest man sacrifice his religion, because some one else is prepared to do so? Certainly not. Of sure, in such a situation he would demand that provision should be made for safeguarding his nationality or his religion, and only then, would he be prepared to surrender his birth right of freedorn in favour of the community as a whole.
It is this question which is now before the people of India. The question before the Muslims is one of nationality and religion. Had it been merely a question of politics, they might have known that political views are always liable to change. But here are two different communities, and powerful communities living side by side who differ from each other in their religion and cul ture. How can the Muslims accept to live as a permanent minority in the presence of a permanent majority, so long as provision has not been made for the protection of their rights? Here is no question of political op1n1on, and therefore, no possibility of a minority changing place
with a majority. The question here is one of national and religiou§ rights. It js meaningless to urge that there should be mutual trust.
that solves the difficulty, then why don't the Hindus trust the Muslims and grant them a majority of the seats as a gesture of confidence? Further, the situation in the States and in Governmental offices has got enough lessons for us. And if in spite of such warning, the Muslims should fail to provide adequate safeguards for their future position, it will be nothing short of national suicide.
In short, the case of a permanent minority with another permanent majority cannot be decided on the same principles, as that of a changing minority with a changing majority. Its decision should follow the same pro�edure a� is observed in the case of a settlement be tween two hostile governments. And if under these cir cumstances, the Mussalmans demand increased repre sentation, their claim cannot be denied. There is no gainsaying the fact that Representative Governments are always run by majorities. When the Muslims are making such a big sacrifice as to entrust the Central Government into the hands of the Hindu majority, are they not en titled to so much as to say that no change in the consti tutional law should be made without their consultation? I have already referred to the conditions laid down by the Nehru Committee for changing the constitutional law, namely, that two-thirds of the members must vote for a such an amendment. Now, even if the Musli� repre sentation should be in proportion to their population, they would have only ¼ of the total seats. In other words it means that, even if not a single Muslim should vote in favour of an amendment, it may still be passed, for on a population basis not more than 25 % of seats would be allotted to the Muslims, while the Hindus would occupy as many as 75 % , and for amending the constitutional law only 66% of the total votes is all that is required. In order, therefore, to give the Muslim elen1ent a proper weight in the Government, they should be allotted not 33 % , but 34 % of the seats in both the houses of Parlia ment. The Hindus under this arrangement lose nothing, for in any case, they retain the majority position. The Muslims do not de�and the right to rule the country. They demand only such rights as would obviate the danger of an infringement of their rights. They can rule India with 34 % of seats as }jttle as with 25 % .