Part I

Revelation, Rationality, Knowledge & Truth, Part 21

‘Any lingering doubt on this point in my readers’ mind may be resolved by referring them to the fact that whenever he brings the general concept under scrutiny — as when he debates the teachability of areté in the Protagoras and the Meno — he assumes without argument that its sole constituents or “parts” (ydpia, uépn) are five qualities which are, incontestably, the Greek terms of moral commendation par excellence: andreia (“manliness,” ‘“courage”), sophrosyné (“temperance,” “moderation” ), dikaiosyné (‘‘justice,” “righteousness”), hosiotés (“piety,” “holiness”), sophia (“wisdom’’).”’

Thus Vlastos is very rational in his stance that it is far more important to search aretes’ intended central meaning which Socrates himself consistently portrays and highlights.

To this intended meaning of arefe another great scholar, Christopher Janaway, refers when he states that Socrates:

“...was concerned with questions of ethics, in particular with defining the virtues (justice, wisdom, courage, piety, temperance). This is how Socrates is portrayed by Plato in the early dialogues, and is how he makes Socrates describe himself in the Apology.”®

‘Central propositions in Socrates’ ethics are: virtue is knowledge; all the virtues are one; virtue is happiness...

‘Socrates also believes that no one who has knowledge of good and bad can lack any of the virtues — with such knowledge one must also be courageous, holy, temperate, and just. Finally, he thinks that the perfectly virtuous person is bound to be happier — to have greater well-being in fact — than someone who lacks virtue.””

We fully accept Janaway’s understanding of Socrates’ ethics.

What Socrates is describing is a law which relates profoundly to human psyche and has to be accepted in its totality. The knowledge that a thorny bush could be the only safe place against a vicious beast would certainly make a sensible man accept the comparatively lesser evil of thorny pricks and, as long as he is protected, the suffering which the thorns cause will, by comparison appear to him as pleasure. While Socrates does not deny the physical suffering of a truly knowledgeable person, what he emphasizes is that whatever action is deemed suitable by a truly knowledgeable person is the only action in which he will find peace. It is as true today as it was then. It explains the optional acceptance of suffering, by godly people, in which they find happiness. For them the converse of losing God’s favour is unbearably painful. Likewise, dignified men who prefer to die in ‘pain’ rather than live in comfort by sacrificing their principles, certainly die ‘happily’ with the realization of their moral victory. They smilingly accept physical suffering rather than the spiritual disgrace which to them is far more punishing.

Vlastos has dedicated a long chapter, Socratic Piety, to resolve an imaginary contradiction in Socrates’ views and his experience. It is a scholarly yet an apologetic attempt on his part to prove that in reality no such contradiction exists. His philosophy is thoroughly rational throughout, as Vlastos sees it, but his experience of revelation and his belief in a Superior Being Who guides his life is the contradiction which must be removed. Thus, he quotes Socrates himself to bring this point home. Of his perfectly rational attitude, Socrates is known to have said:

‘Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort of man who is persuaded by nothing in me except the proposition which appears to me to be the best when I reason (AoyiGopép@) about it.”

Despite his emphasis on reason he appears to Vlastos to be a superstitious man when it comes to his personal experience. Thus he writes:

‘And yet he is also committed to obeying commands reaching him through supernatural channels.’!®

To support his contention, Vlastos quotes Socrates during his trial:

‘To do this has been commanded me, as I maintain,

by the god through divinations and through dreams

and every other means through which divine

apportionment has ever commanded anyone to do

anything.’’°

Having postulated this, Vlastos has written a long discourse on absolving Socrates of what he himself admits of his spiritual experience. Through an involved logic, he finally assumes that Socrates did not genuinely believe in what appears to be his personal confession. Yet despite all his scholarly effort, Vlastos fails to achieve this purpose. Read again for instance the above quoted passage by Vlastos beginning with the words

‘To do this has been commanded me, ...”!°

and note that the word God used by Socrates is in the

singular, yet the author prefers to write it with a small ‘g’. This statement of Socrates, concerning his personal

experience of Divine dreams, revelations and specific commands in other forms, is so powerful and so completely at one with the universal experience of Divine prophets that it leaves no room for doubt that he means exactly what he says. A large number of verses in the Holy Qur’an fully support Socrates when they speak of all the prophets before the Holy Founder of Islam* having shared with him all the different modes of Divine revelation.

Vlastos further builds his contradiction theory by raising the question:

‘Should this incline us to believe that Socrates is counting on two disparate avenues of knowledge about the gods, rational and extra-rational respectively, yielding two distinct systems of justified belief, one of them reached by elenctic argument, the other by divine revelation through oracles, prophetic dreams and the like?’"!

NE IS AMAZED to note how imaginary contradictions O:= be built between what Socrates believed and

what he actually experienced. He is known, of course, to have criticized the so-called Greek gods and disparaged the reliability of their revelation through oracles, but whenever he spoke of his personal experience he never ridiculed, even once, his own Divine revelation or dreams. The author has done no justice to him by adding ‘through oracles’ after ‘divine revelation’. The personal Divine revelation of which Socrates has spoken, as quoted above, has no mention whatsoever of any ‘oracles’. Invariably when he speaks of his personal experience he speaks of ‘God’ in singular, with capital G, and not of ‘gods’. When he mentions the poets’ visions, as though they were god-given, he only uses such expressions as a figure of speech, not meaning them to be actually ‘God- given’:

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